How do small neighboring states respond to China’s ascent? China and Its Small Neighbors by Sung Chull Kim provides a pertinent explanation of the factors that shape asymmetry in both structural and perceptual dimensions, as well as their implications. The book essentially argues that a small state’s coping strategy (hedging) is determined by its structural condition (economic asymmetry vis-à-vis China). Simultaneously, it highlights the factors that influence asymmetry in the perceptual dimension (public opinion, nationalism, and political elites’ judgement), and the interaction between these dimensions. Accordingly, beginning with a discussion of the political economy of asymmetry, the book also demonstrates that perception and public opinion have become increasingly consequential in determining how small states navigate the strategic realities posed by a rising China.
The beginning part of this book (from Introduction to Chapter 2) addresses that the relationship between China and its small neighbors is characterized by “asymmetry” and “vulnerability (to coercion).” Additionally, the asymmetry-vulnerability linkage is measured by three indicators: (1) trade concentration, (2) nontransparency, and (3) (reliance on) bilateral aid.
Within this context, the principal survival strategy of small states is hedging: hedging-on and hedging-against a great power. Hedging-on seeks economic and security benefits from engaging the great power, whereas hedging-against aims to mitigate risks of overreliance through multilateral institutions and diversified partnerships.
The type of hedging differs from country to country. The book’s empirical chapters (from Chapter 3 to Chapter 8) introduce case studies of six small states: Mongolia and North Korea (Northeast Asia), Uzbekistan (Central Asia), and Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam (Southeast Asia).
The findings reveal important variation. Vietnam (Chapter 3), identified as less vulnerable, practices “mixed hedging.” It avoids escalating disputes with China while simultaneously increasing multilateral engagement to strengthen its economic and security capabilities. By contrast, highly vulnerable states such as Cambodia (Chapter 4) and North Korea (Chapter 8) lack the resources for hedging-against, leaving them exposed to Chinese coercion. Both cases demonstrate how China’s no-strings-attached aid and investment may reinforce small states’ vulnerability to coercion. Their relationships with China are classified as “alignment” by this book. States with moderate vulnerability, such as Myanmar and Uzbekistan, pursue “typical hedging.” Myanmar (Chapter 5), constrained by international sanctions against its military rule and ethnic conflict, deepened its reliance on China while also seeking to diversify its economic partners. Uzbekistan (Chapter 6) adopts a balanced multivector policy between Russia, China, and the United States. In particular, with respect to China, it attempts to leverage its strategic relevance on issues such as Islamic extremism and Xinjiang. Mongolia (Chapter 7), landlocked between Russia and China, practices “multidimensional hedging.” While its economic dependency on China continues to grow, it actively hedges against both China and Russia by cultivating ties with developed democracies through its “third-neighbor policy.”
This book enhances our understanding of small states’ strategic choices under asymmetry in three important ways. First, it reveals the complexity of “asymmetry,” that is, great powers cannot always fully exploit small states’ weaknesses. Although vulnerable, small states employ multilateral institutions to hedge against coercive pressure. The sustainability of such strategies, however, depends on the resources and buffers available to each small state. This raises broader theoretical questions about the conditions under which hedging can serve as a sustainable strategy.
Second, the book highlights China’s preference for bilateralism over multilateralism and the consequences thereof. China’s no-strings-attached bilateral aid tends to reinforce a recipient small state’s nontransparency (corruption), thereby intensifying that state’s vulnerability to coercion. To prevent such a vicious cycle of asymmetry and to mitigate the “China Threat,” the author suggests that Beijing should embrace multilateralism. At the same time, the book underscores why a bipolar structure is unlikely to emerge: (1) China does not seek to form an exclusive security bloc; (2) its rise is embedded within the globalized market economy rather than an ideological division; and (3) China remains preoccupied with its own continental security concerns.
Third, the book provides valuable insight into the role of perception and public opinion. Public attitudes toward China show nuanced differences across cases: Vietnam exhibits a historically rooted dual perception of cooperation and conflict; Cambodians increasingly resent environmentally and socially disruptive projects China is behind; Myanmar faces growing public unease over “debt trap” dynamics; Uzbekistan and Mongolia show similar anxieties; and even North Korea retains a perception of cooperation tinged with distrust. Survey data support these observations while also suggesting the need and direction for more refined further research on public opinion: more specifically, potential divergences between public and elite perceptions of China and their impact on state strategy.
The book’s discussion of small states’ hedging strategies can be usefully extended to analyses of how public opinion shapes foreign policy choices under asymmetry. Drawing on two-level game theory, researchers can examine how public opinion enables or constrains small states’ foreign policy decisions. Asymmetry and vulnerability perceived by citizens of a small state form public opinion toward China. Depending on whether such perceptions are positive or negative, the range of government coping strategies will differ. When the public opinion is strongly negative about overdependence on China, it can both pressure and legitimize the incumbent government’s pursuit of hedging-against strategy. However, the degree to which public opinion influences state strategy may differ across regime types: whereas public opinion can meaningfully affect foreign policy in a democracy or a less authoritarian state, an authoritarian state can ignore, control, or even manipulate public opinion.
Relatedly, scholars of public opinion could further explore which factors (e.g., regime type, generation, class, or issue characteristics) produce noticeable gaps between mass and elite perceptions, and how political elites address such gaps, namely, how they justify hedging strategies (whether hedging-on or hedging-against) and shape media discourse accordingly. Future research might also investigate the independent variables that shape public perceptions of China—such as where citizens position China along a spectrum from “opportunity” to “threat”—and identify the factors that improve or worsen public attitudes. Comparative studies across countries could examine whether the book’s three indicators of the asymmetry-vulnerability linkage (trade concentration, corruption/nontransparency, and reliance on bilateral aid) also account for cross-national differences in public opinion. Although the book’s central arguments are rooted in political economy and international relations, it nonetheless offers significant insights for the study of public opinion.
Still, some issues remain underdeveloped. The distinction between “mixed hedging” (Vietnam) and “multidimensional hedging” (Mongolia) is not entirely clear, given that both states display high degrees of independence and multilateral engagement. Whereas Vietnam is portrayed as the least vulnerable of the six cases, Mongolia’s efforts to achieve “nuclear-weapon-free zone” status demonstrate how a small state can survive between big states by pursuing neutrality, forging diverse partnerships, and participating in multilateral institutions. Similarly, Uzbekistan—classified as moderately vulnerable—appears in practice to exercise substantial autonomy: it pursues a balanced policy (not balancing) between Russia, China, and the United States, while China depends heavily on Uzbekistan’s cooperation over Xinjiang. While the typology of hedging (p. 35) provides a useful comparative framework, it risks oversimplifying variation by obscuring empirical nuance.
Overall, this book makes a valuable theoretical contribution to understanding the political implications of economic asymmetry. It demonstrates how small states exercise agency under structural conditions of asymmetry-vulnerability and enriches debates on hedging strategies. Its findings also carry practical significance, particularly as China’s assertiveness increases and U.S.–China rivalry intensifies, compelling small neighbors to refine their strategic choices. In addition, the book lays important groundwork for further research on perception and public opinion in international relations by illuminating the linkage between the structural and perceptual dimensions of asymmetry—such as public sentiment, nationalism, and legitimacy.
Funding
This work was supported by Hankuk University Foreign Studies Research Fund.